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Abstract—LiDAR-driven 3D sensing allows new generations of
vehicles to achieve advanced levels of situation awareness. How-
ever, recent works have demonstrated that physical adversaries
can spoof LiDAR return signals and deceive 3D object detectors
to erroneously detect “ghost" objects. In this work, we introduce
GhostBuster, a set of new techniques embodied in an end-to-
end prototype to detect ghost object attacks on 3D detectors.
GhostBuster is agnostic of the 3D detector targeted, and only
uses LiDAR data that is already available to the target object
detector. It considers the 3D object detectors’ blind spots by
examining the objects’ 3D shadows. Ray optics is used to estimate
the shadow regions and an exponential decay approach minimizes
the importance of noisy points. GhostBuster identifies anomalous
regions and then analyzes their 3D point cluster densities to
distinguish between shadows of ghost objects, and genuine object
shadows. We conduct an extensive empirical evaluation on the
KITTI dataset and find that GhostBuster consistently achieves
more than 94% accuracy in identifying anomalous shadows,
which it can attribute with 96% accuracy to ghost attacks. We
introduce a new class of “invalidation" attacks where adversaries
can target shadows of genuine objects aiming to invalidate them
and we show that GhostBuster remains robust to these attacks.
Finally we show that GhostBuster can achieve real-time detection,
requiring only between 0.003s–0.021s on average to process an
object in a 3D point cloud on a commodity machine.
Index Terms—Autonomous Vehicles, LiDAR, 3D Object Detec-
tion, Automotive Security
I. INTRODUCTION
High-precision depth sensors are increasingly being used for
mapping the environment in a variety of application domains,
such as robotics [1], security surveillance [2], augmented real-
ity applications [3], to cite some. LiDARs (derived from light
detection and ranging) are popular such depth sensors. They
have found widespread deployment [4], [5] in autonomous ve-
hicles (referred to as AVs hereforth) where a new class of Deep
Neural Network (DNN) 3D object detectors leverage depth
sensor measurements (processed in batches called 3D point
clouds) to detect objects – a necessary task for downstream
safety-critical driving decision-making [6]–[9].
Recent studies have shown that it is possible to attack
LiDAR-based perception systems of AVs by spoofing LiDAR
return signals [10]–[12]. In [10], [11], the authors demon-
strated that a physical adversary can relay laser pulses resulting
in an object being perceived closer to the LiDAR unit than
it actually is; and can opportunistically spoof reflected laser
pulses to create fake objects. Cao et. al. conducted in [12]
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Fig. 1. 3D scene’s point cloud visualization with two genuine objects and
their shadows.
a security study of LiDAR spoofing attacks on AVs and
formulated an optimization based attack for input perturbations
that successfully spoofed objects and affected downstream AV
driving decision-making.
Prior studies in defending against such physical attacks on
AV sensors, have focused primarily on RGB-based classi-
fiers [13] which leverage inputs from RGB cameras disregard-
ing the effects of LiDAR-poisoning attacks. Others, have pro-
posed fusing data from co-located heterogeneous modalities,
especially visual (RGB) and depth (D) data, to improve object-
detection systems [14]–[19] and vehicle positioning [20], [21].
However these focus on improving the accuracy of 3D object
prediction tasks in challenging, albeit benign scenarios. Cao
et al. [12] hinted to using information fusion to facilitate
detection of active physical attacks. However, as they also
recognize, such approaches [22], [23] need to assume that the
majority of the sensors are not under active attack. Recently,
Sun et. al. in [24] proposed a defense approach to detect
spoofed objects by using occlusion patterns to verify whether
the point cloud of a given object is valid.
In this work we focus on detecting active data injection at-
tacks on LiDAR sensors assuming neither the presence nor the
cooperation of other sensors, homogeneous or heterogeneous.
Moreover, our approach is applied on the output of 3D object
classifiers, effectively making it agnostic to the classification
model targeted: any object detected by the classifier, either
genuine or fake (ghost), will be subjected to verification. Point-
cloud based 3D detection models [6]–[9] learn and use point
representations to identify objects. Our approach leverages the
blind spot of these 3D object detection models to facilitate
attack detection. When objects are observed from a source of
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light, these objects are illuminated, whereas anything behind
them appears to be in shadow (this is illustrated in Fig. 1
visualizing the measurements captured by a LiDAR sensor
in a real driving scenario). Since LiDARs operate based on
the same physical principles by projecting light pulses, we
leverage that observation and design an efficient and highly
effective detection mechanism which verifies the presence of
3D objects only when they exhibit the expected shadow effect.
Detecting shadows and attributing them to objects, solely
based on 3D point clouds, is not trivial. Determining shadows
of objects is well studied in RGB measurements [25]–[28] but
not in 3D point clouds. Moreover, even if we were able to ac-
curately determine shadow regions, physical effects such as the
light diffraction and beam divergence, co-located and occlud-
ing objects in tandem with inaccuracies in measurements or
sensor calibration, create measurement artifacts within shadow
regions, which makes it hard to determine whether a shadow
region actually corresponds to a true shadow of a genuine
object or the absence of a true shadow for a ghost object.
In addition, to be able to use shadows as part of an attack
detection mechanism, we also have to analyze the adversary’s
capability to bypass this detection by considering a new type
of object invalidation attack, where the adversary’s goal shifts
from injecting ghost objects to poisoning shadows of true
objects making the distinction between poisoned and true
shadows even harder. To address these challenges, we design
GhostBuster which uses a two-tier approach to efficiently and
effectively verify 3D objects.
Firstly, GhostBuster exploits the fact that LiDAR measure-
ments are obtained based on emitted laser rays and employs
optical geometry techniques (or ray optics) to map the ex-
pected 3D shadow region of a detected object. Then it uses
a 3D point weighting and aggregated scoring algorithm lever-
aging exponential decay weight estimation to downplay the
importance of measurement artifacts and determine whether
the proposed shadow region corresponds to (a) a real shadow
or (b) an anomalous shadow. In the latter case, it further
classifies a shadow region as poisoned (thus verifying the
presence of a true object) or ghost object shadow, using a
binary classifier trained on density features extracted from
the proposed shadow region. Our extensive evaluation shows
that more than 98% of the 3D objects in our dataset have
meaningful shadows, and that GhostBuster’s shadow region
estimation closely captures their true shape. We also show that
GhostBuster consistently achieves more than 94% accuracy
in identifying anomalous shadows. GhostBuster can further
classify with 96% accuracy whether the anomalous shadow
corresponds to a ghost attack. In addition we design a novel
strong adversary which follows an optimal strategy to launch
an evasion attack aiming to poison a genuine shadow such
that it gets misclassified as a ghost shadow (and essentially
invalidate genuine object). We demonstrate that GhostBuster
shadow classification remains robust against such state of
the art adversaries. Lastly, GhostBuster achieves real-time
detection rendering it suitable for deployment both offline for
forensic analysis and online for providing hints to vehicle
passengers, operators or end-to-end AI systems. Demos of
GhostBuster can be found on our project’s website [29] 1.
Contributions. Below we summarize our main contributions.
•We perform an in-depth study of the phenomena of 3D shad-
ows for more than 7 object types in real-world AV scenarios
and show that genuine objects have shadows which can be
used as a physical invariant to detect 3D object deception
attacks.
• We propose a set of new techniques embodied in an end-to-
end prototype (GhostBuster) for detecting attacks on LiDAR-
based 3D object detectors where attackers induce fake depth
sensor measurements to spoof objects that are not physically in
the environment. Our approach does not require the presence
(or integrity) of measurements from sensors of other modali-
ties (e.g. RGB cameras) and only makes use of existing depth
measurements. Our approach is also agnostic and orthogonal
to the 3D object classification model used.
• We evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of GhostBuster
using real-world 3D scenes and found that it can achieve real-
time detection of ghost injection attacks.
• We further design a strong adversary capable of launching a
novel class of object invalidation attacks specifically targeting
the proposed method. We evaluate GhostBuster against this
adversary and found that our system remains robust.
Paper Organization. In Section II we provide necessary
background information and elaborate on the threat model
considered in our work. In Section III we analyze a real
dataset to verify the existence of 3D shadows for genuine
objects, and identify key challenges. In Section IV we present
the design of GhostBuster and in Section V perform an in-
depth evaluation of GhostBuster’s effectiveness, robustness
and runtime performance. In Section VI we discuss how
GhostBuster can be used in practice and areas for future work.
In Section VII we identify and discuss relevant prior work and
conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND AND THREAT MODEL
A. Background
LiDAR sensors. To scan the environment, LiDARs emit a
pulse in the invisible near-infrared wavelength (900–1100 nm),
which is reflected on incident objects before returning to the
receiver of the emitter device. Based on the time of flight,
LiDARs calculate the distance between the sensor and the
incident object. LiDARs used in AVs (e.g. Velodyne LiDARs)
emit a number of light pulses from an array of vertically
arranged lasers (16, 32, 64, etc.) that rotate around a center
axis to obtain a 360-view of the surroundings of the sensor
unit. The sensor translates a return signal to a measurement 3D
point consisting of coordinates (x,y,z) and a reflection value
(R) corresponding to the return signal’s reflectivity or signal
strength. 3D point clouds are commonly projected to 2D in a
1To respect the double-blind review process, GhostBuster’s project web-
site [29] is currently anonymized and does not track visitors.
more compact representation called birds-eye view or BEV for
short. Fig. 1 illustrates the BEV representation of a 3D point
cloud captured in a real driving scene.
Attacks on LiDARs. With the widespread adoption of LiDAR
systems in AVs facilitating perception, there is a growing
interest in the security of such systems. In particular, there
have been works studying active injection of laser pulses
(signals) to perturb the sensed environment. Petit et. al. in
[10] first introduced physical attacks on LiDAR systems with
the goal to generate noise, fake echos and fake objects. They
successfully performed attacks that relay original signals from
another location to fake the distance of a real object. The relay
attack was extended to injection of fake objects by replaying
signals. However, they were unable to spoof objects closer than
20m from the LiDAR receiver. In [11], Shin et. al. improved
on the previous work and managed to spoof objects that are
up to 12m in front of the LiDAR receiver, with a limitation of
a maximum of 10 points injected. More recently, Cao et. al
in [12] demonstrated the capability to spoof up to 100 points
and proposed an attack methodology that uses optimization to
to generate adversarial points that can successfully fool object
detection models.
B. Threat Model
Capabilities of the adversary. We consider an adversary who
can inject spoofed LiDAR return signals in a target vehicle’s
LiDAR sensor unit. The adversary aims to deceive the 3D
object detectors, that use the victim LiDAR’s measurements
(3D point clouds), into detecting ghost objects and negatively
affect their environment perception capabilities. We assume
the adversary has state-of-the-art capabilities and can inject up
to 100 points in each 3D point cloud [12]. Even though prior
work only showed that such an adversary can successfully
introduce fake or ghost 3D objects in the Apollo’s 3D object
detection model, we found that other 3D object detectors can
also be trivially deceived (see Ghost attacks below). Thus
we take a proactive stance and consider a stronger adversary
which can introduce ghost objects irrespective of the 3D object
detector used on the target AV. In other words, we do not deal
with how the adversary managed to inject a ghost object on
a target 3D object classifier, but instead focus on verifying
whether the identified object is genuine or not.
Ghost attacks. In our experiments we simulate ghost attacks
on a popular 3D object detector, Point-GNN [8], which
currently ranks within the top 10 on the KITTI evaluation
benchmark. To create ghost objects, we use a “copy-and-
paste” method, where the point clouds of genuine objects are
extracted from real-world point clouds (from the commonly
used KITTI dataset [30]) and used as the full attack traces.
To demonstrate the chosen detector’s susceptibility to realistic
ghost attacks we down-sampled each full attack trace to gener-
ate three smaller traces corresponding to a 10-point adversary,
a 60-point adversary and a stronger 100-points adversary. Each
trace was individually merged in 200 random scenes from
the KITTI dataset, resulting in 600 poisoned scenes. Table I
summarizes the success rate of the adversary in getting a ghost
object detected.
While [12] focused on minimizing the number of injected
points to successfully spoof objects, our proposed defence is
agnostic to how the adversary spoofs an object; our primary
focus lies in detecting successfully spoofed objects. Therefore
for our experiments we used the full attack traces instead of the
down-sampled ones to maximize a successful targeted attack
in each trial. This is not problematic for our shadow region
estimation (see Section IV-B) since any successful injection
would result in a bounding box size that is representative of
the object spoofed.
TABLE I
DETECTION RATE OF DOWN-SAMPLED OBJECTS & FULL ATTACK TRACE
Car Pedestrian Cyclist
10 points 0.119 0.00 0.00
60 points 0.188 0.985 0.985
100 points 0.698 0.990 0.990
Full Attack Trace 0.941 0.990 0.990
Object invalidation attacks. An approach that uses shad-
ows to verify true objects, might incentivize attacks where
the adversary’s goal changes from injecting ghost objects to
invalidating genuine objects. Hence, an adversary might try to
inject fake points inside the shadow region of a target object
to force our object detection validation algorithm to invalidate
real objects. This could lead to a wrong safety-critical decision
being made which can potentially have dire consequences. Our
system recognizes this and thus considers a stronger adversary
which is capable of launching both ghost object injection and
genuine object invalidation attacks. To test the robustness of
our system against object invalidation attacks, we design a new
strong attack with full knowledge of the detection mechanism,
and evaluate the success of this attack against our system (see
Section V-C).
III. SHADOW EFFECTS OF 3D OBJECTS
In this work, we observe that true 3D object representations
in a point cloud are closely followed by regions void of
measurements. We call this the 3D shadow effect. 3D shadow
effects manifest from how LiDAR sensors record measure-
ments (3D points) of return light pulses reflected off an object
in a direct line of sight that returns within a constrained time
period to the receiver of the sensor unit. Thus, anything behind
the incident object cannot be reached by the light rays and
cannot be measured, resulting in the void shadow regions as
depicted in Fig. 1. This observation leads us to hypothesize
that the presence of shadows is a physical invariant that can
be used to verify genuine 3D objects. In this Section we
systematically analyze real 3D driving scenes to verify the
presence of shadows in 3D objects and obtain ground truth
for such shadow regions.
Methodology. We randomly sampled 120 scenes from the
KITTI dataset [30]. The dataset includes LiDAR measure-
ments (point cloud scenes) from real driving scenarios in
Karlsruhe, Germany. The dataset is accompanied by a set of
object labels for training 3D object detectors. We used these
labels to locate true objects in each scene. We then converted
each scene to its birds-eye-view (BEV) representation by
projecting each 3D point to a 2D plane. Subsequently we went
through all 120 scenes and (1) manually annotated shadow
regions, if present, using the VIA annotation tool [31], and
(2) assigned shadow regions to objects.
Object and shadow co-occurrence results. In the 120 sam-
pled scenes, we found a total of 607 objects, where the
breakdown by object categories is detailed in Table II. All
objects are located in the frontal view of the vehicle and
comprise of objects both on the road and on sidewalks. Out of
the 607 objects, we have identified shadows for 597 or 98.3%
of the objects, the details by object type can be found in Table
II. The reason for not being able to identify the shadows for the
remaining 10/607 (1.6%) objects, was the location of objects in
the environment. For example, if one object is directly in front
of another but not fully occluding it, the first object cannot
be unequivocally assigned a shadow region which might be
observed because of the second object. This can occur for
example, when a person is standing in front of a vehicle where
the objects effectively contribute together to the same shadow
effect. Next, we list a number of challenges we identified for
shadow region estimation.
TABLE II
OBJECTS AND THEIR SHADOWS IN 120 SAMPLED REAL-WORLD SCENES.
Count
In Dataset
% of total
Objects
Labelled
Shadows
% of
Object Type
Car 444 73.1 439 98.9
Pedestrian 45 7.4 41 91.1
Cyclist 17 2.8 17 100
Van 56 9.2 55 98.2
Truck 17 2.8 17 100
Tram 6 1.0 6 100
Sitting Person 1 0.2 1 100
Miscellaneous 21 3.5 21 100
Total 607 N.A. 597 N.A.
Challenges in automatically detecting object shadows. La-
belling of shadow regions on the BEV and uniquely assigning
them to objects in a scene can be challenging in some cases,
even in benign scenarios, due to ambiguities in 3D points
and void regions. These challenges can lead to labelling
inaccuracies. We split these cases in two main categories based
on the source of their inaccuracies.
Physical effects. Physical effects such as beam divergence
can create noise artifacts in shadow regions. These result in
3D points being registered inside what is expected to be a
shadow region of an object. We observe that such points appear
mostly closer to the boundaries of regions otherwise void of
measurements. Beam divergence is the widening of laser beam
diameter and occurs when the laser pulse propagates away
from the LiDAR. As the beam widens, the cross-section pulse
energy is spread over a larger area, lowering the energy of
back-scattered returning beams, leading to lowered signal-to-
noise ratio and decreased precision in measurements [32].
Shape of 3D objects. Object detectors, cannot precisely capture
the shape of an object. The ouput of object detection is usually
the bounding box (BB) within which the detected object lies
within. This renders estimation of the precise shadow region
behind BBs challenging.
Location of objects in the environment. We observed four
cases where the placement of objects relative to each other
render shadow region labeling and association with objects
challenging:
• An object is located in the shadow of another object, thus
the shadow of the object is indistinguishable from the shadow
that the object is within.
• Objects are clustered together (e.g. cars parked together
along the side-walk) resulting in a large region of void from
the overlapping shadows.
• An object is in front of a higher object (e.g. car in front of
wall) and hence its shadow overlaps with the shadow of the
high object.
• Objects are too far away from the LiDAR unit, where the
resolution of LiDAR is poorer. It becomes difficult to obtain
the shape of the shadow due to sparsity in measurements.
These cases manifest in benign scenarios (examples are
illustrated in Fig. 15 in Appendix A-A). Things get even worse
when shadows are poisoned (object invalidation attack).
Conclusion. By manually labeling shadow regions for objects,
we found strong evidence of co-occurrence of objects and
shadow regions. This supports our hypothesis that the presence
of shadows is a physical invariant that can be used to verify
genuine objects in 3D scenes. On the other hand we identified
a number of challenging cases which indicate that designing
an effective detection system is by no means trivial.
IV. GHOSTBUSTER DESIGN
In this section, we introduce GhostBuster, a system designed
to detect spoofing attacks poisoning 3D point cloud LiDAR
measurements.
A. GhostBuster’s high level architecture.
GhostBuster’s overall architecture is summarized in Fig. 2.
GhostBuster takes as an input, the output of a 3D object
detector (bounding boxes of detected objects in 3D scene’s
point cloud) and the original point cloud of the scene. Ghost-
Buster performs a three-phase analysis to determine whether
the detected objects are genuine or ghosts. GhostBuster can
further distinguish between ghost objects and genuine objects
whose shadow regions are being poisoned.
GhostBuster’s analysis proceeds as follows. In Phase 1,
GhostBuster employs a shadow region proposal algorithm
which uses geometrical optics (or ray optics) for a monochro-
matic light source (beam) to generate proposed shadow re-
gions for each of the 3D objects detected by the 3D object
detector. The use of ray optics is appropriate since LiDARs
take measurements based on emitted light pulses. By tracing
rays from the reference point of the LiDAR unit in point
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Fig. 2. 3D scene perception pipeline with GhostBuster integrated.
clouds, GhostBuster can determine the boundaries of shadow
regions for 3D objects. However, as discussed in Section II,
the shadow region proposed can be imprecise and can also
encompass a number of 3D point artifacts which in princi-
ple should not be present, as the light rays responsible for
taking that measurement should have already reflected on
the incident surface of the target 3D object. To deal with
these imprecisions, in Phase-2, GhostBuster’s genuine shadow
verification component, performs a point-wise analysis in each
shadow region to determine whether the region is indicative
of a genuine shadow. For this, it uses a novel 3D-point
scoring mechanism, detailed below. If the genuine shadow
verification fails, which would mean the system is either under
a ghost object injection attack or exposed to a genuine object
invalidation attack, GhostBuster uses an adversarial shadow
classification model to determine whether the shadow region
of the detected object is indicative of a ghost object’s shadow
(thereby detecting a ghost attack) or a genuine object’s shadow
(thereby detecting an invalidation attack). Fig. 2 illustrates
the decision workflow of GhostBuster. Below we elaborate
on GhostBuster’s three main components: (a) shadow region
proposal; (b) genuine shadow verification; and (c) adversarial
shadow classification.
B. Shadow Region Proposal
Here, we introduce a shadow region proposal approach
based on geometrical optics (or ray optics) for a monochro-
matic light source (beam) to obtain shadows from the bound-
ing boxes of objects identified from 3D object detectors.
We first elaborate on a fast 2D shadow region estimation,
discuss its limitations, and then, propose an alternative 3D
shadow estimation. The effectiveness of the two approaches is
evaluated in Section V.
2D Shadow Regions. Intuitively, if a scene is converted into
its 2D representation, then, using ray optics, we can obtain
an area (2D shadow region) behind an object within which
rays during data acquisition cannot reach since they would
have already reflected on the incident surface of the object.
Fig. 3 illustrates this concept. To compute the shadow region,
we first convert a 3D point cloud scene into its 2D birds-
eye-view (BEV) compact representation. Next, we compute
the boundary lines of the shadow region. We first take the
coordinates of the bounding box for the detected object from
the 3D object detector. Using the coordinates of the corners of
the bounding box, we compute the gradients of the lines from
the reference point (position of the LiDAR unit on the vehicle)
to each of the corners. There will be 4 coordinates (from the 4
anchoring corners of a 3D bounding box on the ground) in the
x-y plane each with coordinates (xi , yi), ∀i = 1, . . . , 4. The
gradients (mi) of lines connecting the reference point (0,0) to
corner coordinates can be computed with :
mi =
yi − 0
xi − 0 (1)
The minimum and maximum gradient lines define the
shadow boundary lines for the shadow region of the object.
Reference Point
(LiDAR unit)
Line with Maximum
Gradient
Line with Minimum
Gradient
Shadow Region
Object
Fig. 3. 2D shadow region estimation using lines of maximum and minimum
gradients extending from reference point to bounding box coordinates.
To simulate the fact that LiDAR has a finite range we define
a maximum length for shadow regions, which we call the
shadow length (l ). Intuitively, the shadow length depends on
how close the object is to the ray source as well as the height
of the object.
Object
LiDAR
(0,0)
LiDAR
Height
(H) Object
Height (h)
Object
Distance (dobj)
Shadow Length
(l )
Fig. 4. Shadow length of an object (shown on a Z-Y planar view).
From Fig. 4, the shadow length (l ) can be derived from
the height of the object (h), with respect to the height of the
LiDAR unit (H ) and furthest distance of object from LiDAR
unit (dobj ). Using similar triangles,
h
l
=
H
l + dobj
(2)
Shadow length (l ) can be derived :
l = dobj × h
H − h (3)
The shadow boundary lines and the shadow length deter-
mine the full shadow region of the object. In Appendix A-B,
we provide the algorithm (Alg. 1) to compute 2D shadow
regions for objects in a 3D point cloud scene. Fig. 5 illustrates
the 2D shadow region which is obtained using this approach
in a real point cloud scene. We systematically compare the
computed shadow regions against manually labeled shadows
and concluded that the computed regions matches visually
identified void regions (see Section V-A).
Fig. 5. 3D point cloud with bounding box of a car and its shadow region
with projection lines from reference point.
Limitations of 2D Shadow Regions. In principle, shadow
regions in scenes should be completely void of points and
hence it would be trivial to detect attacks by projecting all
the points onto the 2D ground plane before examining 2D
shadow regions for points. However, 2D shadow regions can
only define a 2D area behind the object, which corresponds
to the projection of the shadow on the ground. This can result
in noisy points contaminating the shadow regions in lieu of
taller objects behind the target 3D object. This is illustrated in
Fig. 5 with noisy points shown in the color range of orange
to red in the shadow region of the detected object.
3D Shadow Regions. To address the limitation of 2D shadow
regions we introduce the 3D shadow region estimation. With
3D shadow regions, we examine a volume of space for
presence of points. The base area of the 3D shadow region is
the 2D region obtained using the 2D shadow region proposal
algorithm. To account for the height of the shadow region,
we explore two approaches: (a) simulate LiDAR light rays
as in 2D shadow region estimation, but this time analyse the
points in the region of space bounded from the ground to the
non-occluded incident rays; and (b) use of a uniform height
above the ground level to obtain a short volume of space for
analysis of points (Fig. 16 in Appendix A-C). The choice of 3D
shadow region estimation method and their effects on detection
performance are evaluated in Section V-B.
C. Genuine Shadow Verification
After the shadow regions are identified, GhostBuster per-
forms an analysis inside each region to determine whether the
shadow is genuine or not. As mentioned previously, in princi-
ple there should be no measurements inside shadow regions,
since light rays cannot reach that part of the environment.
However, inaccuracies of the shadow estimation, and noisy
artifacts due to physical effects and the placement and shape
of objects can result in points being recorded inside genuine
shadow regions. Thus, a trivial approach which expects those
regions to be completely empty would result in a high numbers
of errors, essentially flagging real objects as ghosts frequently.
To mitigate this we propose a method which intuitively
reduces the significance of noisy measurements inside shadow
regions while highlighting the significance of suspicious mea-
surements. We observe that, for most genuine objects, it is
unlikely for point measurements to be recorded directly behind
the object (i.e. near the start of the shadow region) and
close to the center of the shadow region. Most points found
in genuine shadow regions are artifacts manifesting due to
beam divergence and the fact that while bounding boxes are
rectangular (in 2D) or cubic (in 3D) convex polygons, in reality
the objects are not. These artifacts tend to appear closer to the
side boundaries of the expected shadow region of an object
(Fig. 6).
Fig. 6. Example of noisy artifacts in a shadow region.
In other words, we expect points to be absent near the
beginning and along the center-line of genuine shadow regions.
If points are found in these regions, this would most likely
indicate that the shadow is not a genuine shadow. For example,
ghost objects cannot “create” shadow regions. To introduce a
shadow region, the adversary would need to either remove
points or hijack an existing shadow. For the former, there is
currently no known mechanism to selectively remove LiDAR
point measurements. For the latter, there is no benefit for the
adversary to introduce a ghost object in the shadow of an
existing object since perceptually the ghost will be further
away than the real object and thus won’t be able to affect an
imminent driving decision.
Our genuine shadow verification method takes the above
into account and classifies a shadow as genuine if it’s anomaly
score it’s below a certain threshold. It first assigns a weight
to each point inside the shadow region. Intuitively, points due
to noise are assigned a lower weight, but if points are found
in non expected regions (i.e. along the center-line or close to
the start-line) these are assigned higher weights.
xmid
xbound
Start-line
End-line
xstart
Mid-line
Boundary-line
Boundary-line
2D Shadow Region (Ground Plane)
point
xend
Fig. 7. Illustration of distances used in 2D shadow region analysis (Eq 4, 5).
Specifically, we use a pair of exponential decay equations
(Eq. (4) and (5)) on two axis of analysis to assign weights to
the points (Fig. 7), where xstart, xend , xmid and xbound are
the distances of the point from the start-line, end-line, center-
line and closest boundary line of the shadow region and α
is a parameter that tunes the rate of exponential decay. The
aggregate anomaly score of the shadow region is computed
using Eq. (7), where wmin is the minimum weight a point
can obtain in any axis of analysis (i.e. point at boundary line)
and T is the total number of points in shadow.
wstart = exp
(
ln(0.5)
α
× xstart
(xstart + xend)
)
(4)
wmid = exp
(
ln(0.5)
α
× xmid
(xmid + xbound)
)
(5)
wmin = exp
(
ln(0.5)
α
)
(6)
score =
∑T
i=1(wstart,i × wmid,i)− (T × w2min)
T × (1− w2min)
(7)
The anomaly score threshold is set empirically. We perform
an extensive analysis and use the Receiver Operating Charac-
teristic (ROC) curve to determine the threshold that produces
the True Positive Rate and False Positive that is acceptable (see
Section V-B).An object is verified as genuine by GhostBuster
if its shadow region gets a lower score than the anomaly
threshold, otherwise the shadow is flagged as anomalous. At
this point GhostBuster can already detect that the system is
under a LiDAR poisoning attack. Nonetheless, we take this
a step further and try to also identify the type of attack the
system is subjected to.
D. Adversarial Shadow Classification
A high shadow anomaly score can indicate either a ghost
attack or an object invalidation attack. Being able to identify
which attack the LiDAR sensor is subject to, has its own merit
and it’s an important aspect of GhostBuster. More importantly,
potential post-detection actions leveraging GhostBuster’s out-
put can be very different as we would like to ignore ghost
objects but we cannot ignore true objects subjected to an
invalidation attack. Here we elaborate on how GhostBuster
distinguishes between the two.
We observe that during Ghost Attacks, the shadow regions
of ghost objects exhibit a high density of points as a result of
LiDAR pulses being reflected off the ground in front of the
vehicle. In contrast, points are sparse in the shadow regions
of true objects during an invalidation attack (Illustrated in Fig.
17 of Appendix A-D). Therefore, we expect the distribution
of points within the shadow regions of ghost vs invalidated
objects to be distinguishable. Leveraging these observations
we use a clustering approach to extract density features from
shadow regions which we then use to train a binary adversarial
shadow classifier. GhostBuster uses this classifier to determine
whether an anomalous shadow is the result of a ghost attack
or an invalidation attack.
Feature Extraction. In order to characterize the density of
the measurements in a shadow region, we cluster together
points that are in spatial proximity. To do this we use a
clustering algorithm “Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Ap-
plications with Noise" (DBSCAN) [33]. The advantage of
using DBSCAN over other clustering algorithms is that it is
able to identify points that are clustered in arbitrary shapes
without the need to pre-specify the number of clusters in the
region. This suits our use-case, as point clusters in 3D point
clouds are irregular, unlike the circular shapes which most
clustering algorithms assume the data to have, and the number
of clusters in a region is not known a priori, which would be
a parameter required with most other clustering approaches.
DBSCAN works by searching a neighbourhood around a point
(specified as a parameter) to look for points in close proximity
to form clusters. Clusters are established only if a group fulfils
a minimum criterion, i.e. a minimum number of points.
Clustering points in shadow regions with DBSCAN, allows
us to extract the number of clusters found by controlling the
density of clusters. Intuitively we would expect the shadow
regions of ghost objects to exhibit multiple clusters with
regular and similar shapes. On the other hand, during a genuine
object invalidation attack, we would expect the shadow region
to be mainly void of points with points injected by the attacker
to elicit a high aggregated score near the region of high
weighting as modeled by the exponential decay equations in
the axis of analysis. Thus, a distinguishable characteristic of
shadows during such an attack would be the small number
or no clusters detected.(Fig.17 in Appendix A-D: (a), where
clusters are colored and un-clustered points are in black; and
(b) where the injected cluster is colored red and un-clustered
points are in black).
From DBSCAN results, we use the following features to
characterize the shadows of objects:
• Number of clusters. This is the number of clusters in the
shadow region obtained from DBSCAN.
• Average density of points in clusters. This is obtained by
taking the total number of points in clusters and averaging out
by the number of clusters.
Attack Classification Model. The shadow characteristic fea-
tures obtained from DBSCAN can now be used as input
to classification models to distinguish ghost shadows from
genuine-looking shadows. In Section V, we evaluate multiple
classifiers such as Logistic Regression, Random Forest and
Support Vector Machines (SVM) to determine their per-
formance in the binary classification task of distinguishing
between shadows of ghost objects and shadows of objects
under an invalidation attack. We chose these classifiers as
they tend to do well for low dimensionality data. We found
that SVMs generally outperforms the other two classifiers
with highest AUC-ROC of 0.972 (for SVMs with linear
kernel and polynomial kernel with degree 2), and thus we,
recommend using them with GhostBuster. However, SVM
learns a decision boundary separating the two classes, which
maximises the margin, i.e., the smallest distance between the
decision boundary and any of the samples. Since in realistic
data, classes are not linearly separable in the feature space,
we use a soft-margin SVM [34] which allows for overlapping
class distributions.
Note that the attacker can elicit a high anomaly score
by opportunistically injecting a single point at the shadow
location of highest weighting. However, this is not enough to
generate a cluster due to the pre-set minimum number of points
required. To defeat the mechanism, an attacker would have
to effectively emulate shadows representative of ghost attack
shadows, which requires both injecting points at regions of
high weighting as well as having the ability to create multiple
clusters with sufficient density of points (i.e. to emulate the
shadow features of ghost shadows). In Section V-C, we design
a new invalidation attack based on current known capabilities
of LiDAR spoofing adversaries and evaluate GhostBuster’s
robustness against it. We found that a strong adversary with
state of the art capabilities and full knowledge of the behavior
of the defense mechanism cannot cause a misclassification of
an invalidation attack shadow to a ghost object shadow.
V. EVALUATION
In this Section we introduce our evaluation of GhostBuster
focusing on its effectiveness in detecting ghost and invalidation
attacks and its efficiency in doing so. Specifically, we aim to
answer the following research questions:
• RQ1: How accurately can GhostBuster estimate shadow
regions?
• RQ2: How accurately can GhostBuster distinguish between
genuine shadows and anomalous shadows?
• RQ3: How accurately can GhostBuster detect ghost object
and invalidation attacks?
• RQ4: How efficient is GhostBuster?
A. RQ1: performance of shadow region estimation
Methodology. We analyze GhostBuster’s accuracy of 2D
shadow region generation by comparing it with the 597
manually labelled shadows of objects (see Section III for
ground truth collection). We evaluate the 2D region generation
separately since 3D regions build on top of it. The significance
of 2D vs 3D region estimations in the detection performance
is evaluated separately in Subsection V-B.
Shadow Region Correspondence Metrics. To quantify how
closely GhostBuster can match the objects’ observed shadows,
we measure their Intersection over the Union (IoU) and
perform a procrustes shape analysis.
The IoU of two shadow regions gives a measure of similar-
ity in the 2D space they occupy. It is the overlap of the area
of the regions divided by the union of the regions and is an
indication of how well the regions match in space. An IoU
value of 1 means that the two regions are perfectly matched
and 0 means the two regions are disjoint.
Procrustes analysis uses landmarks of a shape as a rep-
resentation and perform isomorphic scaling, translation, and
rotation to find the “best fit" between the shapes. The results
of the analysis provides us with two metrics: (a) similarity
of the shapes; and (b) scale differences of the shapes [35]–
[37]. For similarity, values close to 1 mean that the shapes are
identical. For scale, value of 1 means that the size of the shapes
are identical and anything less than 1 means the ground-truth
shadow shape is smaller, and larger than 1 is the opposite.
Results. Table III summarizes our results across all object
types. Detailed results per object type are shown in Ap-
pendix A-E: Table VI.
TABLE III
AGGREGATED CORRESPONDENCE METRICS OF ALL OBJECTS
IoU Similarity Scale
Mean 0.728 0.713 1.286
Median 0.760 0.969 0.970
Standard Deviation 0.152 0.376 2.08
From the median values of the corresponding metrics, it can
be observed that, for more than half the objects, the computed
shadow matches closely with the ground-truth shadow (IoU,
Similarity and Scale values are close to 1). We do observe
some variation in the results which can be attributed to
measurement inaccuracies and human-errors in the labeling
process (see Section III), and to over-estimation of shadow
areas. GhostBuster uses bounding boxes which are larger
than the actual objects and this results in larger shadow
regions. However, GhostBuster’s exponential decay approach
to weighting the significance of 3D points in shadows (see
Section IV) compensates for this. This is verified with Ghost-
Buster’s overall accuracy in detecting genuine shadows, ghost
and invalidation attacks (see Subsections V-B and V-C).
Conclusion. Overall, our findings suggest that that the shadow
regions computed by GhostBuster’s region proposal algorithm
have good match with the void regions identified and labeled
manually from visual inspection.
B. RQ2: performance of anomalous shadow detection
Methodology. GhostBuster detects anomalous shadows by
performing a 3D point-wise inspection of the shadow regions.
Our objective is to identify shadows that indicate either a ghost
attack or a genuine object invalidation attack. Invalidation
attacks occur when the adversary aims to take advantage of
the presence of GhostBuster to force the system to invalidate
a real object. Therefore, we first focus on evaluating how well
GhostBuster can detect ghost attacks. GhostBuster’s abilty to
detect invalidation attacks is evaluated next in Subsection V-C.
To evaluate the performance of GhostBuster’s shadow scor-
ing method, we introduce ghost objects, each individually in
200 random scenes from the KITTI velodyne dataset. We
then measure how well GhostBuster is able to distinguish
between ghost objects and real objects. The object detector
used for the object detection task is a pre-trained Point-
GNN [8] model, which is currently ranked within top 10 on
the KITTI evaluation benchmark for the object types: car,
pedestrian and cyclists. We consider all three object types in
our evaluation. There are a total of 867 true objects in the 200
scenes which are counted as True Negatives if GhostBuster
does not flag them as anomalous, otherwise they would be
counted as False Positives. We performed ghost attacks (see
Section III) on the random scenes, for each of the objects, and
evaluated the ability of GhostBuster to identify the shadow
of these “ghost" objects as anomalous (i.e. True Positive);
failure to do so would be a False Negative. We retrieve
the bounding boxes coordinates of every detected object in
the scene by Point-GNN, which we input into GhostBuster
along with the original point cloud. Then, for each object
claimed by the 3D object detector, ghost and genuine, we
evaluate whether GhostBuster was able to correctly detect
ghost object’s shadows as anomalous and real object shadows
as non-anomalous.
We evaluated GhostBuster’s scoring method using 2D
shadow Regions (BEV) and 3D Shadow Regions (Ray Height
and Uniform Height). For uniform height 3D shadow regions,
we evaluate using different height values ranging from 0.1m
to 0.6m above ground level.
Shadow Anomaly Detection Performance Metrics. To eval-
uate GhostBuster’s ability to detect anomalous shadows we
used the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve, the
Area Under Curve of ROC curve (AUC-ROC), F1 score and
Accuracy. The ROC curve shows the discriminatory ability
of the detector. It shows the trade-off between True Positive
Rate (TPR) vs False Positive Rate (FPR) at various threshold
values. The AUC-ROC summarises the performance of the
detector and can be interpreted as the probability of the
detector providing an accurate prediction. The F1 score is the
harmonic mean of precision and recall where the value of 1
indicates perfect precision and recall. Lastly, Accuracy shows
the fraction of the predictions that the detector got right.
Results. The results of performance evaluation are summa-
rized in Fig.8, 9, 10 and 11.
2D vs 3D Shadow Regions. First, we observe that 3D shadow
regions with uniform height above the ground level outperform
the other shadow regions of interest. This can be attributed to
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the reduction of noisy points (stray reflections or overhanging
objects such as branches of trees and sign posts) when we
only consider a small volume above ground which captures
the LiDAR scan reflections off the ground when there are no
objects. This results in a more accurate scoring of the shadow
region to detect anomalous shadows that have points in sub-
regions of high weighting.
Height Sensitivity Analysis. For shadow regions with uniform
height above ground, we performed sensitivity analysis to find
the optimal height for detection of ghost objects. The height
that yields the best AUC-ROC is 0.3m above the ground
with a score of 0.93, 0.94 and 0.97 for detection of injected
Car, Pedestrian and Cyclist respectively. Shadow regions with
uniform height of 0.3m also gave the best maximum F1 Score
and Accuracy for detection of the injected objects.
Overall we found that 3D shadows, with uniform height of
0.3m above the ground and an anomaly score threshold of
0.241 provide the best overall trade-off of TPR vs FPR for all
injected objects. In particular, with the above configuration,
we obtain an overall accuracy of 0.94, TPR of 0.92 and FPR
of 0.059 for anomalous shadow regions due to Ghost Attacks.
We then took a closer look into the sources of errors. The
false negatives (ghost objects not detected by GhostBuster)
in the dataset are found to be attributed to injected objects
being implanted in regions that are already void of points due
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to incomplete LiDAR measurements (Fig. 18(a) in Appendix
A-F). Note that this is due to LiDAR’s failure to take measure-
ments of the ground level. As LiDAR technology gets better,
our approach’s accuracy will also improve. The false positives
(real objects flagged as potential ghosts by GhostBuster) are
due to their shadows having point measurements from other
larger objects behind them (Fig. 18(b) in Appendix A-F). This
may (very rarely) happen although the safety repercussions are
less important in this case since the second object (right behind
the first) will be correctly validated.
Conclusion. We evaluated the performance of the shadow
region scoring mechanism for various shadow regions of
interest for objects detected in the scene. Using 3D shadow
region with uniform height of 0.3m above the ground provided
the best shadow anomaly detection performance with an AUC-
ROC of 0.97, overall Accuracy of 0.94 and F1 Score of 0.89.
C. RQ3: Performance of attack classification
GhostBuster is very effective in detecting anomalous shad-
ows. Nonetheless, we would also like to determine whether an
anomalous shadow is a result of a ghost attack or a genuine
object invalidation attack, as these should be handled very
differently by an end-to-end decision system. In this Section
we perform an analysis to first show how the features extracted
from shadow regions by GhostBuster’s differ between ghost
object shadows and genuine object shadows, and that they can
be used to train a binary classifier (subsection V-C1). Next,
we evaluate GhostBuster’s classification robustness against
a strong invalidation adversary which uses state-of-the-art
LiDAR injection capabilities and full knowledge of the clas-
sification method aiming to force a genuine shadow to be
misclassified as a ghost shadow (subsection V-C2).
1) Feature Characteristics of Shadows: Here we evaluate
whether GhostBuster’s selection of features can be potentially
used to train a classifier to distinguish between ghost object
shadows and genuine object shadows. We used genuine object
shadows for comparison with ghost object shadows for two
reasons. (a) GhostBuster’s anomaly detection might (but very
rarely) incorrectly mark a genuine object’s shadow as anoma-
lous. Being able to distinguish between the two, acts as a sec-
ond line of validation which can correct GhostBuster’s mistake
in the previous phase. This can lead to better utility. (b) An
invalidation attack adversary targets genuine object shadows.
Thus the distinction between genuine and ghost shadows can
serve as a baseline for detecting against invalidation attacks
(in the next subsection we use this baseline to design a strong
invalidation adversary).
Methodology. We use the 600 scenes (200 scenes × 3
objects injected) from subsection V-B. GhostBuster’s 3D
shadow region generation was used to generate shadows of
uniform height 0.3m for objects. Using DBSCAN ( =0.2,
min_points=5) we compute the number of 3D point clusters
in each shadow region and density of the clusters. The shadows
are labeled (ghost vs genuine). We then split them into a
training set and a test set (80:20). We use the first set to train
six different binary classifiers (see Table IV) and evaluated
their performance on the test set. As we are most concerned
with TPR and FPR of classifiers for best utility, we use AUC-
ROC as the decision criteria to choose the model.
Results. We found that the prevalence rate of feature combi-
nation of 0 clusters and 0 cluster density for genuine shadows
is 78.5% (2044/2603) and ghost shadows 3.5% (20/567).
From Fig. 12, we further observe that 91.5% (2383/2603)
of the genuine object shadows are found to have less than
5 clusters and 95.3% (2483/2603) have less than 10 clusters.
Of those genuine shadows with clusters, 81.2% (2113/2603)
have average clusters density of less than 5 points and 97.3%
(2534/2603) have average cluster densities of less than 20
points. These genuine shadow regions are opportunities for
an adversary to perform an invalidation attack. A least effort
adversary will target shadows which will likely incorrectly be
marked as anomalous or force triggering anomaly detection
with a single 3D point injected in sub-regions of high impor-
tance. Even so, these shadows will result in shadows looking
identical than the genuine object shadows.
From the second row in Fig. 12 which shows the feature
distribution of anomalous shadows, we observed that the
scoring mechanism has removed 94% of the genuine shadows.
The shadows attributed to ghost objects have large number of
clusters and high average cluster density. The observation of
differences in the shadow feature distribution of genuine and
ghost shadows suggests that a binary classification model can
be used to distinguish ghost from invalidation attacks.
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Table IV summarizes the performance of the different clas-
sifiers in distinguishing between shadows of ghost and genuine
objects. We found that two classifier models significantly
outperform the others in distinguishing between ghost and
genuine shadows: 1) SVM with linear kernel or 2) SVM with
polynomial kernel of degree 2. From the accuracy and F1-
score, the linear kernel seems to have better classification
performance over the polynomial kernel, although the AUC
is almost equivalent.
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE METRIC FOR SHADOW CLASSIFIERS
Accuracy F1-Score AUC-ROC
Logistic Regression 0.961 0.885 0.936
Random Forest 0.975 0.924 0.944
SVM- Linear 0.964 0.895 0.972
SVM-Poly(deg=2) 0.962 0.887 0.972
SVM-Poly(deg=3) 0.951 0.862 0.914
SVM-RBF 0.973 0.922 0.963
2) Robustness of Classification: Next, we define a strong
invalidation adversary and evaluate GhostBuster’s classifica-
tion robustness against it.
Evasion Attacks on Shadow Classification Model. Ghost-
Buster’s use of shadows, as an invariant for detecting LiDAR
spoofing attacks, can incentivize a new class of object inval-
idation attacks targeting genuine objects’ shadows. Here, we
define an invalidation attack by a strong adversary with full
knowledge of GhostBuster’s defense mechanisms and state-
of-the-art LiDAR spoofing capabilities.
The invalidation attack can be formulated as an evasion
attack on the adversarial shadow classification model. We
consider a strong adversary who has knowledge of the classi-
fier’s decision boundary and feature representation (i.e. shadow
characteristics features). The adversary’s goal is to perform a
test-time evasion attack and introduce points in the shadow
region of a genuine shadow to change the shadow’s character-
istics and cause the shadow classification model to misclassify
the genuine shadow as a ghost object shadow, effectively
invalidating the real object.
We can evaluate the robustness of the classification accord-
ing to the capability of the adversary. In our case, we define
the attacker’s capability as the total number of points that can
be injected in a target shadow region in a single point cloud
scene. We refer to this as the adversary’s “point budget". We
can define the invalidation adversary’s budget BA as:
n0 + np = Nc × ρc, s.t. np ≤ BA (8)
where n0 is the original number of points in the shadow
region, np is the number of injected malicious points, Nc is
the number of clusters after injection, and ρc is the average
cluster density after injection.
Intuitively, the invalidation adversary’s optimal strategy
against GhostBuster can be defined as follows: Given a set
of features for a genuine shadow, inject the minimum number
of points, np, to deceive the classifier by modifying the com-
bination of cluster density and number of clusters, subjected
to a point budget BA and the configuration parameters of
DBSCAN used by GhostBuster. This optimal attack strategy
can be formalized as follows:
minnp, s.t. ∃ Nc ∈ Z+| F ((n0 + np)/Nc, Nc) = 1 (9)
where F (·, ·) is the output of the classifier, which is one if an
attack is identified as a ghost and zero otherwise.
As the complexity of the optimization problem in Eq. (9)
is reduced: np ∈ Z+ is a scalar and the classifier just has two
features, the problem can be easily solved by applying simple
techniques such as the bisection method.
We evaluate the robustness of the adversarial shadow clas-
sifier against an invalidation adversary setting the DBSCAN
parameters as before ( =0.2, min_points=5). For the classi-
fiers, we compare the robustness of both linear and non-linear
SVM models against these evasion attacks, which aim to inject
points into a genuine shadow region.
To visualize the maximum cluster-density combination the
attacker can introduce given a budget BA, we use the Maxi-
mum Operating Curve (MOC), which shows the set of valid
(ρc, Nc) combinations on the feature space that can be reached
for a given BA (we use 20, 40, 60, 100 and 200 points). In
our previous experiments we found that 78.5% of the genuine
shadows have 0 clusters (see Section V-C1). Thus, for solving
the problem in Eq. (9), we start exploring cluster-density
combinations on the feature space from value 0 for both Nc
and ρc = (n0 + np)/Nc.
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Fig. 13. Scatter plot of shadow features and decision regions from SVM-
Linear Classifier. Dashed lines are operating curve of adversary according to
their budget from (0,0).
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Fig. 14. Scatter plot of shadow features and decision regions from SVM
Classifier with a polynomial kernel with degree = 2. Dashed lines are operating
curve of adversary according to their budget from (0,0).
This is a very strong adversary because we assume that:
(a) the adversary can predict the optimal cluster-density
combinations; (b) the adversary can identify where the 3D
points should be introduced in the environment to achieve that
combination; (c) it is feasible to introduce those measurements.
Results. Fig. 13 and 14 are the scatter plots of all shadow
features with the decision regions from the boundary of the
linear and non-linear SVM classifiers respectively. A point in
the red region is the feature combination where the classifier
model will label the shadow as a ghost attack and blue region
an invalidation attack. The dashed curves represent MOCs2 for
different budgets from the origin (0,0), which is the feature
combination for 78.5% of all genuine shadows in our dataset.
In Fig. 13, we observe that for MOC of 20 points, the curve
lies completely in the blue region (non-ghost shadow), which
indicates that any combination of features with a budget of
20 points would not be able to change the label of a genuine
shadow with the original feature combination of (0,0). For
MOCs of 40 points and above in the linear SVM decision
region, we observe that there are regions where the curves
are in the decision region of ghost shadows. This shows that,
given the different attacker’s budgets shown in Figure 13, the
linear SVM model is only robust to an adversary of 20 points
for 78.5% of the genuine shadows.
Similarly, in Fig. 14, we show the decision regions obtained
from the SVM (poly deg=2). We observe that for MOCs of
up to 100 points, the curves lies completely within the blue
decision region for non-ghost shadows. This indicates that the
non-linear SVM model is robust against adversary with state-
of-the-art LiDAR spoofing capabilities of up to 100 points, as
shown in [12]. Our results in Fig. 14 show that the attacker
needs to inject up to 200 points (twice the budget of attacker’s
capability in [12]) to evade the non-linear SVM classifier.
Conclusion. We used DBSCAN to extract features charac-
teristic of ghost and genuine shadows. The features were
used to train a binary classifier to identify ghost attacks. The
performance of both linear and non-linear SVM is comparable
(96%). However, the robustness of the non-linear classifier
is clearly superior in terms of robustness to attacks, i.e. the
attacker needs to spoof approximately 10 times more points
to evade detection by GhostBuster.
D. RQ4: GhostBuster’s Runtime Efficiency
Methodology. We use the same adversarial dataset as in
previous subsections. It consists of 600 ghost objects (3 ghost
object types injected in 200 random scenes each) and 2,600
genuine objects across 600 scenes. For each scene, we measure
GhostBuster’s end-to-end analysis time for each identified
object (genuine and ghost), starting from the time GhostBuster
receives the 3D objects bounding box coordinates until Ghost-
Buster labels the object. We also measure the execution time
for each component of GhostBuster. GhostBuster is configured
to use 3D shadow generation with a uniform height of 0.3m
2The MOC contains discrete values, given the set of valid combinations
(ρc, Nc). For illustration purposes, we plot the MOC as a continuous contour.
above the ground, an anomaly score threshold of 0.241,
DBSCAN for feature extraction with  =0.2, min_points=5,
and our pre-trained SVM binary classifier with a polynomial
kernel of degree 2. GhostBuster’s prototype implementation is
written in Python with 1200 lines of code. We measure the
execution time on a machine equipped with an Intel Core i7
Six Core Processor i7-7800X (3.5GHz) and 32GB RAM.
Results. Table V summarizes our results. The first three rows
detail the time taken to process genuine object shadows while
the last three are for ghosts (ghost object types average size is
depicted in Table VII in Appendix A-G). The results show that
GhostBuster can process objects in a scene in 0.003s–0.021s
on average. We observe that genuine objects are processed
much faster than adversarial objects. This is important since
this corresponds to the cases most frequently encountered by
AVs. The longer duration taken to process adversarial object
shadows is mainly due to the feature extraction step, which
is triggered when a shadow is deemed anomalous by the
shadow scoring mechanism. The variation observed in the total
execution time, comes from the different object sizes and the
different point densities in their shadows.
Looking at the individual components, we see that shadow
generation contributes the least to the overall compute time
with around 0.33ms on average across object types. Shadow
scoring takes 6.2ms across objects but with discernible varia-
tion. The variation comes from the density of points found in
the shadows (Fig. 19 in Appendix A-G), as shadow scoring
performs a point-wise analysis. Lastly, the shadow verification
step only happens if a shadow is deemed anomalous. Thus
for genuine objects (which is the most frequent scenario) this
step is never triggered. For anomalous shadows, GhostBuster
extracts point density features from shadows for classification.
This is the most costly step in the adversarial scenarios requir-
ing 10.7ms on average. For feature extraction, GhostBuster
uses DBSCAN that performs a point-wise analysis which
explains the large variations we observe—DBSCAN’s running
time is O(n log n) in theory while Fig. 20 in Appendix A-G
details its empirical evaluation with our dataset.
TABLE V
PROCESSING TIME FOR GENUINE AND ADVERSARIAL (ADV) OBJECTS
Shadow
Generation
(ms)
Shadow
Scoring
(ms)
Shadow
Verification
(ms)
Total
Time
(ms)
Car 0.4±0.3 4±10 N.A. 4.4±10.3
Pedestrian 0.3±0.1 6±8 N.A. 6.4±8.1
Cyclist 0.3±0.1 3±4 N.A. 3.3±4.1
Car (adv) 0.4 0.1 10±6 10.06±20.05 20.46±26.15
Ped. (adv) 0.3 0.1 7±5 10.06±17.05 17.36±22.15
Cyc. (adv) 0.3±0.1 7±6 12.06±24.05 19.36±24.15
Conclusion. We show that GhostBuster can be implemented
in real-time applications requiring between 0.003s–0.021s end-
to-end average runtime for processing an object in a 3D point
cloud. This is only a small fraction of the time a 3D object
detector takes to analyze a 3D point cloud—Point-GNN has
an average inference time of 0.6s [38].
VI. DISCUSSION
Utility. Our evaluation shows that GhostBuster can be used to
efficiently and accurately detect attacks on AV 3D perception.
However, even though very rarely, it is possible that mistakes
will be made. Thus, we caution against using it on its own for
driving decision making. Instead, we envision GhostBuster to
be part of a more complete set of mechanisms that provide
real-time hints and explanations to drivers, vehicle operators
or more sophisticated AI systems for autonomous driving.
Moreover, we envision GhostBuster contributing to a vehicle’s
black box (similar to black boxes in avionics) to facilitate
offline incident and forensics analysis.
Opportunities for Future Work. Adversaries might target
GhostBuster’s use of shadows to force a genuine object to
be misclassified as a ghost (invalidation attack). However,
our evaluation shows that GhostBuster is robust against a
strong adversary with more advanced capabilities than the
current state-of-the-art realistic LiDAR spoofing adversaries.
At the same time, it offers a new ability to detect ghost
attacks in a highly efficient manner without requiring either
extra hardware, or assuming the presence and integrity of
other sensors, homogeneous or heterogeneous. For a LiDAR
spoofing adversary to succeed launching an invalidation attack
against GhostBuster, they will have to closely emulate a ghost
object’s 3D shadow. But for that, they would need to have the
capability to create reasonably large regions of artificial 3D
environments, making the use of depth sensors all together
ineffective. Tackling such sophisticated and costly attacks,
would require using trustworthy sensor fusion. We plan to
explore this in future work.
Lastly, GhostBuster assumes that an adversary cannot re-
move LiDAR measurements. An adversary that can selectively
cancel out 3D point measurements can create artificial shadows
for ghost objects. This might be possible if special physical
materials with high reflectance properties are strategically
placed to cause refraction of LiDAR signals. To the best of
our knowledge it is currently an open question whether such
attacks are feasible.
VII. RELATED WORK
3D Object Detector Attacks. Prior work showed that point-
cloud based 3D object detectors are vulnerable to LiDAR
spoofing attacks [10]–[12] and point cloud perturbation at-
tacks [39]–[43]. Wicker and Kwiatkowska [44] further found
that 3D object detectors are trained to learn object represen-
tation from a “critical point set”, and subtle changes in the
input greatly impact the model’s performance. These works
show that point cloud based 3D object detectors are not robust,
highlighting the need for an orthogonal defence mechanism.
GhostBuster looks into the blind spots of these models to
successfully detect 3D point spoofing and perturbation attacks.
3D Object Detector Defenses. Existing defenses for 3D point
cloud object detection focus on defending against point cloud
perturbations [41], [42], [45]. For point injection (or LiDAR
spoofing) attacks in AV settings, suggestions were made to
use multi-modal sensor fusion [22], [23]. RGB-D fusion was
suggested before [14]–[21]. However, these focus on improv-
ing the accuracy of 3D object prediction and positioning in
challenging, albeit benign scenarios. In [22], [23] the authors
suggested sensor fusion to improvie attack resilience, but make
strong assumptions about the integrity of sensor measure-
ments. GhostBuster, however, makes no assumptions about
the availability or integrity of other sensors and solely uses
existing characteristics of LiDAR measurements for detection.
More recently, [24] proposed leveraging occlusion patterns
to detect spoofed objects. Specifically, their approach ex-
ploits the free space between the LiDAR sensor and detected
object to obtain the LiDAR point cloud occlusion pattern,
together with looking at point cloud distribution in the object’s
bounding box. This approach first checks for the presence of
occlusions and uses occluding patterns to check for consis-
tency with the point cloud of a detected object. In contrast,
GhostBuster looks into the region behind a detected object to
determine if the point cloud distribution in this shadow region
is characteristic of a realistic shadow as a result of the physical
phenomena of object occlusion.
3D Shadows. Prior works studied the negative effects LiDAR
ray occlusion by objects (or shadows) has on the accuracy
of information measured in 3D object detectors [46], urban
environments [47] and in orthophotography for Geospatial
Information Systems [48]–[52]. The latter propose occlusion
detection methods such as Z-Buffer Algorithm, height-based
ray tracing and surface-gradient for post-processing correction
to produce high quality orthophotos. Although these algo-
rithms provide highly accurate results, they have long com-
putational time and are not suitable for real-time applications.
GhostBuster is the first to provide 3D shadow detection and
analysis methods appropriate to the AV domain. Moreover, all
the above aim to reduce LiDAR inaccuracy caused by void
regions, whereas GhostBuster uses the characteristics of those
void regions to verify the objects causing them.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
LiDARs enable accurate 3D object detection and play an
important role in autonomous driving. However, recent works
have demonstrated that 3D object detectors can be deceived
to detect “ghost” objects by spoofing LiDAR return signals.
While sensor fusion could be applied to increase resilience,
most prior attempts use sensor fusion to improve the accuracy
(and sensitivity) of object detection or assume the availability
and integrity of extra sensors. In this work we have proposed
GhostBuster, a system which relies solely on existing LiDAR
measurements to detect such attacks, and is agnostic to the
detector targeted. GhostBuster introduces the concept of 3D
shadows and, techniques for mapping shadows to 3D objects,
dealing with noisy measurements in shadows, and scoring
shadow regions to detect potential attacks. Furthermore, it uses
the 3D-point density features extracted from shadow regions
to distinguish between ghost attacks and object invalidation
attacks (a new type of attack targeting the defense system).
Our thorough evaluation shows that GhostBuster achieves 94%
and 96% average accuracy in identifying anomalous shadows
and classifying them as either ghost or invalidation attacks.
We further design a strong invalidation adversary aiming
to evade classification and found that GhostBuster remains
robust. GhostBuster can process an object in a 3D point cloud
in real time (0.003s–0.021s on average).
Our experience developing GhostBuster also highlights two
important lessons. Firstly, that introducing defenses, may also
introduce new opportunities for adversaries. For example,
object invalidation attacks specifically target shadow regions,
and could lead to worse consequences than ghost attacks.
Thus, it is paramount for defenses to be designed and tested
against potential opportunistic adversaries. Secondly, system
decisions made based on incomplete perceptions of reality are
vulnerable: a ghost attack targets the absence of verification
of an object’s expected 3D shadow; an invalidation attack
aims to inject unexpected measurements in shadows to make
them appear unrealistic. A defense in depth approach that
models an optimal attack strategy–such as our modeling of the
operating curve of the adversary on decision regions—can help
provide strong robustness guarantees. Finally, we believe that
this work can spur new directions of research leveraging phys-
ical invariants (such as shape, speed, acceleration, movement
trajectories, etc.) for verifying the output of 3D perception
models used in autonomous agents.
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APPENDIX A
A. Challenging scenarios for shadow region estimation.
Fig. 15 illustrates representative cases which render shadow
region estimation challenging. The challenging scenarios de-
picted are:
(a) An object is located in the shadow of another object, thus
the shadow of the object is indistinguishable from the shadow
that the object is within.
(b) Objects are clustered together (e.g. cars parked together
along the side-walk) resulting in a large region of void from
the overlapping shadows.
(c) An object is in front of a higher object (e.g. car in front of
wall) and hence its shadow overlaps with the shadow of the
high object.
(d) Objects are too far away from the LiDAR unit, where the
resolution of LiDAR is poorer. It becomes difficult to obtain
the shape of the shadow due to sparsity in measurements.
(d) Object are far away from LiDAR unit and resolution is too poor to determine shadows
(a) Objects located in shadows of other objects
(b) Objects clustered together resulting in a large void region of overlapping shadows
(c) Objects are located near higher/taller objects (i.e. wall) resulting in overlapped shadows 
Fig. 15. Scenarios that make it challenging to attribute shadow regions of
objects for labelling.
B. 2D Shadow Region Estimation.
The following algorithm computes the 4 corners of a 2D
shadow region in the ground plane.
Algorithm 1 Corner points of 2D shadow regions for objects
points = []
for each obj in objectsInScene do
length ← get_shadow_length(dobj , h, H) . Eq (3)
min_grad, max_grad ← 0
obj_bbox_coords ← get_coords(obj)
for each coords in obj_bbox_coords do
grad ← compute_gradient(coords, ref_coords)
if grad ≤ min_grad then
min_grad← grad
start_1← coords
else if grad ≥ max_grad then
max_grad← grad
start_2← coords
end if
end for
end_1← get_end_point(start_1, min_grad)
end_2← get_end_point(start_2, max_grad)
points.append((start_1, start_2, end_1, end_2))
end for
return points
C. 3D Shadow Region Estimation,
We propose and evaluate two different ways for estimating
3D shadow regions. Figure 16 helps visualize the intuition
behind these approaches. In the former case (a) the height of
the shadow is calculated using ray optics; while in the latter
(b) we use a uniform height across the length of the shadow.
Object
LiDAR
Height of 3D
Shadow Region
Follow Ray Height
Object
LiDAR Uniform Height
Shadow Region
(a) Height varies with ray
(b) Uniform height
Fig. 16. Illustration of 3D shadow regions obtained using different height.
D. DBSCAN clusters for Ghost and Invalidation Attacks.
Fig. 17 shows an example of a shadow of a ghost object
(a) and a shadow of a genuine object under an invalidation
attack to pass the shadow anomaly threshold. We show that
using DBSCAN we can extract shadow characteristics such as
the number of clusters and density of clusters to distinguish
between the two cases. The coloring shows how clusters are
formed with DBSCAN (16 vs 1).
Ghost Attack
Invalidation Attack
(a)
(b)
Injected Points
Fig. 17. DBSCAN results for (a) Ghost Attack and (b) Invalidation Attack.
E. Detailed Correspondence Metrics by Object Types
Table VI provides a break down of the correspondence
metrics for shadows of the various objects in the KITTI
dataset. GhostBuster’s shadow region estimation was used to
generate shadows for objects in the 120 random scenes and
the generated shadows were compared with their manually
labelled shadow regions. We observe that for all objects (with
the exception of Sitting Pedestrian), we obtain good results
for IoU and Shape Similarity and Scale scores (i.e. median
values are close to 1). The large variance in metrics is due to
challenging scenarios (shown in Appendix A-A) and noisy
artifacts that makes it difficult to provide proper manual
labelling of shadow regions, resulting in some discrepancies
in some corner cases.
TABLE VI
CORRESPONDENCE METRICS BY OBJECT TYPES
Count IoU Similarity Scalemean / median / standard deviation
Car 439 0.737 / 0.765 / 0.143 0.698 / 0.965 / 0.384 1.24 / 0.970 / 1.69
Pedestrian (Ped.) 41 0.640 / 0.629 / 0.131 0.726 / 0.965 / 0.368 2.20 / 0.981 / 4.81
Cyclists 17 0.599 / 0.693 / 0.218 0.723 / 0.984 / 0.388 0.821 / 0.964 / 0.316
Van 55 0.754 / 0.780 /0.153 0.772 / 0.977 / 0.347 1.29 / 0.971 / 2.52
Truck 17 0.753 / 0.819 / 0.220 0.808 / 0.989 / 0.303 0.872 / 0.916 / 0.223
Tram 6 0.801 / 0.773 / 0.0667 0.64 / 0.754 / 0.407 0.673 / 0.814 / 0.371
Sitting Ped. 1 0.525 0.332 0.865
Miscellaneous 21 0.694 / 0.757 / 0.156 0.790 / 0.969 / 0.324 1.25 / 0.962 / 0.918
F. Genuine Shadow Verification: FP vs FN
Figure 18 illustrates representative examples of (a) false
negatives (where a ghost object’s shadow is verified as gen-
uine) and (b) false positives (where a genuine object’s shadow
is determined as anomalous) in GhostBuster’s detection of
anomalous shadows. In the former case, this is due to the
failure of the LiDAR sensor to take ground measurements. In
the latter case, even if the fron object is labelled as ghost,
the object immediately behind it is not, therefore the safety
repercussions are diminished.
Object's shadows with points
from another object
Injected Object has empty
shadow region
Ego-
Vehicle
Injected
Cyclist
No
Cyclist
Genuine
Pedestrian in
front of
Genuine Car
(a) (b)
Fig. 18. (a) False Negative and (b) False Positive examples in genuine shadow
verification detection.
G. Details and Sources of Variation in Runtime Analysis
Table VII shows the average sizes of different object types
used in runtime analysis. Fig. 19 and 20 illustrate the de-
pendence of shadow 3D point densities in the calculation of
shadow anomaly score and in extracting the shadow classifi-
cation features respectively.
TABLE VII
AVERAGE TIME TO CALCULATE SHADOW REGIONS FOR OBJECTS AND
THEIR AVERAGE DIMENSIONS.
Car Pedestrian Cyclist
Average Time (s) 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003
Average Height (m) 1.54 1.78 1.76
Average Width (m) 1.64 0.59 0.62
Average Length (m) 3.76 0.83 1.76
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Fig. 19. Average shadow scoring runtime per point density.
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Fig. 20. Average DBSCAN runtime per point density.
